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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
CHRISTIAN DUANE OBAY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 43351
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-5982
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Mr. Obay argued the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction of
sentence. The State makes two arguments in response. First, it contends the district
court lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion because it failed to rule
on that motion within a reasonable time. Second, it contends that even if the district
court had jurisdiction to consider Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion, it did not abuse its
discretion in denying that motion.
arguments.

This Court should reject both of the State’s

On the record presented, the district court had jurisdiction to consider
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Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion, which it ruled upon 197 days following entry of judgment,
and it abused its discretion in denying that motion.

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Consider Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 Motion
Rule 35 states in pertinent part that “[t]he court may correct a sentence within
120 days after the filing of a judgment of conviction . . . .” I.C.R. 35(b). In State v.
Chapman, our Supreme Court rejected a strict interpretation of this rule, and held that a
trial court has a reasonable time to act on a Rule 35 motion following the expiration of
the 120-day period following the entry of judgment. 121 Idaho 351, 352-54 (1992). The
State contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Obay’s Rule 35
motion because it did not rule on that motion within a reasonable time after the
expiration of the 120-day period.

(Resp. Br., pp.2-3.)

The State asserts there is

“nothing in the record [that] shows a reason for the delay.” (Resp. Br., p.3.)
Contrary to the State’s position, there is a clear explanation in the record for the
district court’s delay in ruling on Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion. Mr. Obay filed his Rule 35
motion on November 18, 2014, which was nineteen days after the entry of judgment.
(R., pp.68-71, 88-89.) Mr. Obay specifically requested leave to supplement his motion
with supporting documentation and/or other evidence. (R., p.88.) He filed supporting
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documentation on May 5, 2015, which was 187 days after the entry of judgment.
(R., pp.96-99.) The district court ruled on Mr. Obay’s motion only ten days later, on
May 15, 2015. (R., pp.100-01.) In State v. Book, our Supreme Court held that a trial
court’s delay in ruling on a Rule 35 motion “was reasonable” where “the record
demonstrates that the trial court delayed ruling on the motion in order to give [the
defendant] time to gather additional information, and then ruled shortly after the
information was received.” 127 Idaho 352, 356 (1995). Like in Book, the district court’s
delay here was reasonable.
The State asserts that the district court gave Mr. Obay until December 31, 2014,
to supplement his Rule 35 motion and warned that the motion would be denied if no
further information was provided by that date. (Resp. Br., p.3.) The State cites the
district court’s order denying Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion in support of this statement.
(Id.) Indeed, in its order denying Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion, the district court stated:
“On December 17, 2014, this Court gave Defendant leave to file supplemental material
by December 31, 2014, or the Motion would be denied. Exh. A.” (R., p.100.) This
statement appears to have been erroneous, as there is no exhibit attached to the district
court’s order, and the record reflects only one event occurring on December 17, 2014,
and that was an order to transport, which made no mention of Mr. Obay’s Rule 35
motion.1 (R., pp.5, 90.)
The 120-day limitation contained in Rule 35 serves two purposes—“it protects
judges from repeated pleas by those sentenced and it ensures that the court does not
1

Prior to filing the opening brief, the undersigned counsel for Mr. Obay requested from
the district court the exhibit referenced as “Exh. A” in the district court’s order denying
Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion. In response, the district court provided the Order to
Transport, dated December 17, 2014, which is contained in the record at page 90.
3

usurp the responsibilities of the parole officials by acting on the motion in light of the
movant’s conduct while in prison.” State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 616 (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Because the record demonstrates a legitimate reason for
the district court’s delay and there is no indication that the delay implicated either
purpose of the 120-day limitation, the district court had jurisdiction to consider
Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion. See, e.g., State v. Fisch, 142 Idaho 781, 786 (Ct. App.
2006) (concluding the district court possessed jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s
Rule 35 motion where “the record demonstrates legitimate cause for the delay . . . and
does not disclose any act of the trial court taken with the purpose or the effect of
infringing upon the prerogatives of the parole authorities”). Moreover, the State does
not cite any authority which suggests that the length of the district court’s delay—just
over two months beyond the 120-day period—was not reasonable. And, indeed, it
appears that the contrary is true. See State v. Simpson, 131 Idaho 196, 197 (Ct. App.
1988) (“Delays ranging from five months to one year after the expiration of the 120-day
period have been deemed reasonable, while delays ranging from eight months to two
years have been deemed unreasonable.”)

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 Motion
The State contends the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion because Mr. Obay did not present new evidence in support
of his motion. (Resp. Br., pp.3-4.) The State is incorrect. In support of his Rule 35
motion, Mr. Obay wrote, “I feel that my sentence was based upon charges that were
dismissed in another case” and “I believe I was sentenced based solely on the
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dismissed case and my prior record.” (R., p.98.) This was new information that the
district court did not consider at sentencing.
As explained in Mr. Obay’s opening brief, the district court determined the length
of Mr. Obay’s sentence based largely on charges against Mr. Obay that were
dismissed. Under Idaho law, “[t]he district court may, with due caution, consider the
existence of the defendant’s alleged criminal activity for which no charges have been
filed, or where charges have been dismissed.” State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411
(Ct. App. 1992). However, this information may only be considered if the defendant has
the opportunity to object or rebut the evidence. See State v. Stewart, 122 Idaho 284,
287 (Ct. App. 1992.) Mr. Obay was not given that opportunity here, as he pointed out to
the district court in the letter he submitted in support of his Rule 35 motion.
The district court gave another reason for denying Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion. It
stated that it denied the motion because it was effectively a second motion, interpreting
Mr. Obay’s addendum, filed on May 5, 2015, as a second Rule 35 motion rather than a
supplementation of the Rule 35 motion filed on November 18, 2014. (R., pp.100-01.)
This was not a valid basis for denying Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion because, as
discussed above, Mr. Obay specifically requested leave to supplement his Rule 35
motion with supporting documentation and/or other evidence. (R., p.88.) And, also as
discussed above, there is no indication that the district court ever ruled on Mr. Obay’s
“original” motion or gave Mr. Obay a deadline to file his supplemental material, despite
the court’s statement to this effect. (R., p.100.) Thus, the district court erred as a
matter of law to the extent it denied Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 because it was “effectively a
second motion.” (R., p.101.)
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On the record presented, the district court abused its discretion in denying
Mr. Obay’s Rule 35 motion because the original sentence of seven years, with two
years fixed, for one count of unauthorized use of public assistance benefits which
resulted in a loss of just over $1,000, was unduly severe. Mr. Obay filed only one Rule
35 motion and presented additional—and compelling—information in support of that
motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Obay respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2015.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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